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Abstract 
This paper theoretically and empirically explores the impact of financial 
liberalisation (FL) in the form of an increase in real interest rates and in financial 
deepening (the broad money supply as percentage of GDP) on the rate of 
economic growth in Bangladesh using endogenous growth theory, time series 
techniques and annual data from 1975-95 . Our theoretical model predicts that FL 
and an increase in investment in human and physical capital raise economic 
growth. The overall empirical results support the prediction of our theoretical 
model, although the coefficient of physical capital is statistically insignificant. 
Results are robust across methodologies. 
Key Words: Financial liberalisation; Human Capital; Endogenous Growth; 
Bangladesh; Cointegration. 
JEL classification: C22; E44; G28; F13; O11; O53. 
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Financial Liberalisation and Endogenous Growth: The Case of Bangladesh 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the impact of financial liberalisation
1
 (FL) on the rate of 
economic growth in a less developed country. In particular, the effects of interest 
rate deregulation and an increase in financial deepening in LDC such as 
Bangladesh are analysed using annual data from 1975 to 1995, within an 
endogenous growth model and time series techniques. It is now acknowledged 
that the financial sector of a country is crucial to economic development (Levin 
(1997)). However, the controversy over relative advantages and disadvantages of 
FL in LDCs is yet to be resolved. The McKinnon-Shaw school argues that  FL 
boosts saving, investment and its efficiency, which in turn enhance economic 
growth (McKinnon (1973); Shaw (1973); see also Fry (1995) and R. Levine 
(1997) for surveys); the structuralists and the neo-Keynesians argue that FL is 
deleterious to growth (Burkett, and A. K. Dutt (1991); Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 
1992); Taylor (1983); Wijnbergen (1983); Siddiki (1999a) for a survey of both 
types of theories). 
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 FL generally incorporates interest rate deregulation,  an increase in branch 
expansion and in financial deepening (the ratio of money to GDP), an end to 
preferential credit, less credit to the government sector and more credit to the 
private sector. 
There is growing empirical literature examining the impact of FL on the 
rate of economic growth in LDCs. The general findings of the empirical literature 
reveal that FL positively affects economic growth rates, which along with real per 
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capita income in countries with liberalised financial sectors are higher than in 
countries with repressed financial sectors (see Fry (1995)). 
The dependence of the existing FL and economic growth literature on 
neoclassical growth theory (NGT) weakens the significance of positive 
relationships between financial variables and economic growth. This follows from 
the fact that the presence of diminishing returns to capital as is predicted by NGT 
dictates that long run growth rates in per capita income will not be enhanced by an 
increase in the level of saving and investment. This limitation of NGT motivates 
the emergence of endogenous growth theory (EGT), which predicts that FL 
positively affects economic growth. 
Exploring the impact of FL on economic growth in less developed 
countries (LDCs) using EGT and time series techniques is rare and the impact is 
yet to be explored. This paper fills this gap by extending the Pagano (1993) model 
to incorporate human capital (HC) (see section four). Our extended model 
predicts that FL also contributes to economic growth by facilitating education and 
training which enhance the quality of HC, an important growth enhancing factor in 
EGT. 
 Bangladesh, which followed repressive financial policies until the mid-
eighties (see table 2 in the Appendix), suffered from the negative effects of 
financial repression  with a low level of saving, investment and economic growth. 
There are few studies which examine the role FL on saving, investment and 
economic growth in Bangladesh. Ahmed and Ansari (1995) have estimated saving 
and money demand functions to examine the prediction of the   McKinnon-Shaw 
model in Bangladesh using annual data from 1973-91. The authors found that 
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financial intermediation and interest rate rises increase saving; the saving-income 
ratio positively and interest rates negatively affect the demand for money, 
providing some support for the McKinnon-Shaw model. This study does not 
analyse the time series properties of the data. Siddiki estimated the money demand 
function (M2) using time-series techniques and annual data from 1975-95 (Siddiki 
(1999b). The author found that domestic interest rates positively and foreign 
interest rates negatively affect the demand for money and hence monetary 
accumulation. 
In our paper, the extended Pagano model is  applied to Bangladesh using 
data from 1975-95. Both the cointegration (Engle and Granger (EG) (1987))  and 
fully modified least squares methods (FMLS) (Phillips and Hansen (1990)) are 
used to test the robustness of our results. The FMLS method is intended to 
correct for the problems of endogeneity and serial correlation that may arise in the 
EG method. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section two explains the 
financial policies in Bangladesh and their consequences on saving, investment and 
its efficiency and on the rate of economic growth. The existing literature is 
reviewed in section three. An endogenous growth model which incorporates 
financial variables and investment in physical and human capital is developed in 
section four. To the best of our knowledge, such an analysis has not been 
attempted before for a LDC. And it provides a strong motivation for writing this 
paper. Section five reports the econometric results. Section six draws conclusions. 
2. Financial Policies in Bangladesh: 1971-1995  
  6 
Financial policies in Bangladesh can be divided into two regimes: controlled and 
uncontrolled. The controlled regime was from 1971 to 1986 and the (partially) 
uncontrolled regime started in 1986. In the first regime, nominal interest rates 
were controlled and fixed by the Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of 
Bangladesh. The financial sector was also repressed by: (i) directing credits 
towards the „preferential‟ sectors and (ii) government over-borrowing from this 
sector. 
The aim of the repressive interest rate policies was to reduce the costs of 
investment and to increase the rate of economic growth as well as to reduce 
government budgetary constrains. The government budget deficits were around 7-
9% during 1971-95 (see table 2 in Appendix for all of the figures reported in this 
section). The high rate of inflation with administratively determined lower levels of 
nominal interest rates caused real interest rates to be negative until 1985. On the 
other hand, real interest rates from 1986-onwards have been positive. Similarly, 
until 1985, the ratio of foreign to domestic interest rates was greater than one, 
implying lower domestic rates relative to foreign ones. The opposite has been true 
since 1986. In addition, the extent of financial repression is reflected in (the high 
average rate of) UM premiums (Fry (1997)), measured as the difference between 
official and unofficial rates as a per cent age of unofficial one, which were about 
49% during 1974-95 in Bangladesh. These premiums are measured as the 
differences between unofficial and official exchange rates as a percentage of 
unofficial ones. 
These restricted financial policies in Bangladesh reduces financial saving. It 
is also reflected in the low level of investment or saving to GDP ratios and in real 
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GDP growth rates. The investment to GDP ratio remained 10-14% during 1974-
95. The average ratio of domestic saving to GDP for the same periods was three 
percent of GDP and reached to less than seven percent in 1994/95. Similarly, the 
efficiency of investment as indicated by incremental output-capital ratios is very 
low implying a mis-allocation of scarce resources. The real GDP growth rates 
have been less than four per cent during this period despite the fact that average 
per capita income during 1974-95 was only US$ 161 (it reached to US$ 247 in 
1994/95). Thus, Bangladesh has been associated with high levels of financial 
repression as well as high UM premiums and with low levels of saving, investment 
and real GDP growth. 
 
3. Financial Liberalisation and Economic Growth: A Review 
The financial system of a country is crucial to development and the controversy 
over relative advantages and disadvantages of FL in LDCs is yet to be resolved. 
The McKinnon-Shaw school favours FL and argues that financial repression in the 
form of ceilings on interest rates which causes real rates to be negative distorts the 
economy in the following way (Fry (1995, 1997)): a low level of interest rates:  
(i) encourages individuals to increase present consumption and reduce saving for 
future consumption below the socially optimal level;  
(ii) causes both an under supply of loanable funds and credit rationing;  
(iii) generates investment in low-yielding projects or in inflation hedges rather than 
in the accumulation of financial savings, causing investment to be constrained by 
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savings and the choice of capital-intensive but less productive projects due to the 
low costs of funds;  
(iv) the financing of low risk (and therefore low yield) projects since the financial 
institutions (FIs) are barred from charging the high risk premia associated with 
high return projects.  
In addition, a low level of lending rates causes under-investment in the collection 
of information about projects or borrowers. The government can further distort 
the financial market by offering relatively high interest rates on government bonds 
in order to borrow money from financial institutions; this government borrowing 
crowds out private borrowing or investment (Schreft and Smith (1997)). 
Contrary to the McKinnon-Shaw School, structuralists argue that low 
levels of real interest rates and credit towards priority sectors would increase 
investment and economic growth (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1992)). They also 
suggest raising government expenditure in order to increase effective demand, 
investment and economic growth where seigniorage or inflation tax is an „easy‟ 
source of government revenues. 
Interest rate deregulation increases saving on the one hand and reduces 
effective demand and profits on the other (Burkett and Dutt (1991); Gibson and 
Tsakalotos (1994) see for a survey). The negative impact often dominates the 
positive one due to a pessimistic view regarding future profits, which  worsens the 
negative impact, causing a decline in saving, investment and economic growth. In 
addition, an increase in interest rates: (i) causes a real exchange rate appreciation 
and exerts a negative impact on the tradable sector by making exports more 
expensive; (ii) incurs losses to a bank when it is lending long-term and borrowing 
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on a short-term basis; and (iii) raises government budgetary strains since in LDCs 
a significant proportion of deficits are financed by bank loans. Moreover, a 
reduction in reserve requirements and a relief from buying government bonds 
reduces tax revenues. 
The neo-Keynesians also argue that a low level of real interest rates may 
be because of: (i) a low level of demand for investment caused by depressed 
expectations and high levels of uncertainty about the future; (ii) cash holding or 
liquidity preference or the accumulation of savings to make large purchases when 
access to credit markets is limited. Consequently, saving takes place even when 
interest rates are negative and any initiative to increase real interest rates generates 
an over supply of funds and damage the stability of the financial sectors 
(Beckerman (1988)). 
Structuralists also argue that financial institutions maximising expected 
profits usually charge interest rates lower than the equilibrium rates and decline to 
supply funds to borrowers who are willing pay equilibrium rates. Thus, contrary to 
the prediction of the McKinnon and Shaw school, credit rationing prevails even in 
the absence of ceilings on interest rates. In addition, information and monitoring 
are public goods which are very important for the financial markets and 
undersupplied by competitive markets (Stiglitz (1994)). FL also reduces the 
supply of loans by inducing people to transfer their deposits from the unorganised 
money (or curb) markets (UMMs) rather than from inflation hedges to formal FIs 
(Taylor (1983) and Wijnbergen (1983)). Unlike to UMMs, formal FIs in LDCs are 
  10 
not user friendly and cannot lend on a one for one basis due to reserve 
requirements. 
A host of empirical studies have been carried out and the general findings 
of them support the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis, i.e. more liberalised financial 
regimes are associated with faster economic growth (see Levin (197); Fry (1995); 
Siddiki (1999a); Ghatak (1997)). However, most of the studies are based on 
NGT. This dependence on NGT weakens the significance of positive relationships 
between financial variables and economic growth, since the presence of 
diminishing returns to capital as predicted by NGT dictates that long run growth 
rates in per capita income will not be enhanced by an increase in the level of saving 
and investment.  This type of limitation of NGT motivates the emergence of 
endogenous growth theory (EGT), which predicts that FL (King and Levine 
(1993)) along with investment in physical (Romer (1986)) and human capital 
(Lucas (1988)) enhance economic growth. 
Using EGT, King and Levine predict that FIs increase the productivity of 
investment and contribute economic growth by: efficiently evaluating projects and 
selecting the most promising ones; pooling household savings and mobilising them 
to finance more promising projects and sharing and diversifying risks associated 
with innovations. FIs also contribute to the productivity of investment and 
economic growth by reducing cash holding and liquid, i.e. unproductive, 
investment to meet agents‟ future liquidity demand (Bencivenga and Smith 
(1991)). In an another study, using cross-section data for 80 countries over the 
period 1960-1989 and EGT, King and Levine (1993) show a significant positive 
relationship between various financial indicators and real per capita income. 
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Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) have also empirically shows that financial 
repression causes high rates of inflation and a reduction in the productivity of 
capital which in turn reduces economic growth rates. 
 
4. The Theoretical Model 
In this section, we extend the Pagano (1993) model to incorporate HC since FL 
increases the quality of HC by financing education to financially constrained 
households (Gregorio (1996)). EGT predicts that HC is one of the main engines of 
economic growth - a common feature in LDCs. The Pagano model predicts that 
FL increases: (i) saving and investment; (ii) the proportion of saving that goes to 
investment and (iii) the efficiency of investment by improving competitiveness, 
availability of information regarding the investment projects. Using an AK version 
of endogenous growth model, Pagano postulates that these above three factors in 
turn increase the rate of economic growth. Our extended model predicts that there 
is an additional efficiency gain caused by the accumulation of HC resulting from 
FL. To explain our model, assume that aggregate output is a linear function of the 
aggregate capital stock: 
 
where Yt is aggregate output, Kt is the aggregate capital stock and t is time. This 
production function represents a competitive economy with the presence of 
externality or spillover effects. Each firm faces constant returns to scale, but the 
K A = Y tt  
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economy as whole shows increasing returns to scale with respect to Kt. Suppose 
the population is stationary and the economy produces a single good which can be 
consumed or invested. Assuming the rate of depreciation of investment is zero and 
gross investment is: 
This is a one-sector economy with no government and external sectors. Assume 
that FIs channel a proportion φ of saving, St, to investment, It, i.e. the proportion 
(1 - φ) of saving that is lost in the process of intermediation. Therefore, the capital 
market equilibrium condition is: 
Using equations (4.1) and (4.2), the growth rate at time t+1 can be written as 
follows: 
 
where gt+1 is the growth rate of income at time t+1. Define the steady state as Kt = 
Kt+1 = K; Yt = Yt+1 = Y; gt = gt+1 = g. Substituting equation (4.3) into equation 
(4.4) the steady state growth rate (g) can be written as follows: 
K + I = K 
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where s is S/Y. Taking the logarithms of equation (4.5), we can write: 
Equation 4.6 distinguishes three channels: φ, s and „A‟, through which FL could 
influence economic growth. The transmission mechanisms are explained below. 
 
4.1 Funnelling Saving to Investment 
FIs collect private savings and direct them into investment. FIs cannot generally 
transform all savings into investment since transaction costs and profits absorb 
some of the funds. A proportion (1 - φ) of saving remains out of investment. FL in 
the form of the expansion of bank branches and a reduction in reserve 
requirements boosts competition among FIs, which reduces their commissions and 
fees, the difference between lending and borrowing rates and hence there is a rise 
in φ. The structural equation for φ can be written as follows: 
where FDφt represents a vector of government financial policies which help or 
hinder financial development and competition. The signs of the vector of 
parameters φ1 are positive when policies reduce reserve requirements, restrictions 
on new banks or branches and hence boost the financial markets, vice versa. 
 
 s A = 
Y
I
 A  = g   
  s +   + A  = g lnlnlnln   
u + FD   +  =  tt10t  lnln  
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4.2 Improving the Allocation of Investment 
The FIs play their second role in improving the efficiency of funds by channelling 
them towards more productive projects and by promoting education and training. 
FIs increase the efficiency of investment in the following ways: firstly, FIs provide 
information on more productive investment opportunities ((Bencivenga and Smith 
(1991))). Secondly, FIs help in channelling funds towards more risky but 
productive projects by risk sharing and portfolio diversification (Paul (1992)). 
Thirdly, FIs also help in channelling funds towards long run and productive 
projects and reduce premature liquidation by fulfilling unexpected future liquidity 
demands (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). Finally, FIs can facilitates education and 
training of financially constrained young agents by providing study loans. Hence, 
the second behavioural equation can be written as follows: 
where Δ is the difference operator, ΔY/ΔK is the ratio of  incremental output 
(GDP) to capital (IOCR) and HC is human capital. FL improves the efficiency of 
investment, which is reflected in the IOCR. FL also increases the quality of HC. 
Both effects together increase „A‟. 
 
 
4.3 Effects on the Rate of Saving 
As predicted by the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis, FL in the form of an increase 
in real deposit rates to assure a positive real rate of return influences people to 
0> A ,A   withu, +HC  A + )
K
Y
(  A + A = A 21210 lnlnln


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invest their saving in financial assets instead of investing in inflation hedges. Thus, 
FL increases private saving, i.e. bank deposits, which in turn increase credit, 
investment and economic growth. The behavioural equation for the saving ratio 
can be written as follows: 
where DRst represents deposit rates. Substituting equations (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9), 
we obtain the following reduced form equation: 
where u is an identically and independently distributed error term, with other 
variables as defined above. Equation 4.10 predicts that economic growth is 
positively affected by the capital-output ratios, human capital, interest/deposit 
rates and a policy vector which boosts or deters  financial deepening. 
 
5. The Empirical Model 
The empirical counterpart of equation 4.10 can be written as follows: 
0 > S   with,u + DR  S + S =  s 1tst10 lnln  
0, >  0, >  0, >  0, > 
 
u; + DR  + FD   + HC   + )
K
Y
(   +  = g 
4321
43210

 lnlnlnln


 
0, >  0, >  0, >  0, > 
 
u; + DR  + FD  + HC  + INV  +  =y 
4321
23210


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where y is real per capita income with the GDP deflator (base 1990) used as a 
deflator; INV is the incremental output to capital ratio proxied by the ratio of 
GDP to investment. HC is human capital, measured by secondary school 
enrollment as a share of the total population (data for the total school age 
population are not available); FD is financial deepening measured by the broad 
money supply as a percentage of GDP; DR is real weighted deposit rates 
measured by weighted deposit rates minus the rate of inflation which is estimated 
from the consumer price index (base 1990) of middle income people in Dhaka. 
The sources of data are explained in the Appendix. All variables except DR are in 
natural logarithms. We have also proxied INV by the ratio of the incremental 
output to capital. This change does not alter the overall results (available on 
request). Sample periods with annual data: 1975-95. 
We first apply the EG method. The augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) test 
results in table 1 included in the Appendix show that all variables are I(1), i.e. the 
levels are non-stationary, while the first differences are stationary at a 5% level of 
significance. Microfit 4.0 is used for all statistical analysis in this paper (Pesaran 
and Pesaran (1997)). In the next step, in tests for cointegration, is to establish a 
static long-run relationship among the variables. The results of the cointegrating 
regression estimated by OLS over the periods 1975-95 are as follows: 
_R
2
 = 0.99, DW = 1.79, S.E. of regression 0.012382, RSS = 0.0024529, SBC = 
57.6687, ADF = -6.1541 (with two lags) (5% critical value = -5.19), AR1-F(1, 
(2.91)           (10.50)        (12.25)       (0.58)   (139.53)   
DR 0.000918+FD 0.162+HC 0.334+INV 0.011+857.=y
********
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15) = 0.081378[0.779], AR1-λ2(1) = 0.11331[0.735], RESET-F(1,15) = 
0.002928[0.958], RESET-λ2(1) = 0.0040994[0.949], NOR-λ2(2) = 
0.77[0.77686], H-λ2(1) = 3.1642[0.075], H-F(1, 19) = 3.3708[0.083], ARCH-
λ2(1) = 0.7654[0.395], ARCH- λ2(2) = 2.1143[0.347]. 
Throughout our analysis, t-statistics are reported in the parentheses, ** 
and * represent 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively
2
. All the values are 
statistically insignificant implying no evidence of mis-specification. Thus the model 
(equation 5.2) passes all diagnostic tests. The variables are cointegrated at the 5% 
level as the estimated ADF statistics are lower than the critical value. However, 
the coefficient of INV is statistically insignificant in the both long- and the short-
run (see below). Excluding INV, we re-estimated the model as follows: 
                                               
2
 
  AR1-F and AR2-λ (2) are the F and chi square tests, respectively, for first order 
residual joint autocorrelation; RESET-F and RESET-λ2 are the F and chi square 
tests for mis-specified functional form; NOR-λ2(2) is the chi square statistic for 
testing normality; H-λ2(1) and H-F are the chi square and F statistics, respectively, 
for testing heteroscedasticity; ARCH-λ2(1) and ARCH-λ2(2) are the first and 
second order tests for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity; probability 
values are reported in the square brackets. 
_R
2
 = 0.99, DW = 1.81, S.E. of regression 0.01236, RSS = 0.0025038, SBC = 
58.9752, ADF = -5.8155 (with two lags) (5% critical value  = -4.7635), AR1-F(1, 
16) = 0.056836[0.815], AR1-λ2(1) = 0.074[0.785], RESET-F(1,16) = 
(3.19)         (10.70)        (12.60)   (258.195)   
DR 0.000815 + FD 0.161 + HC 0.331 + 887. =y 
********
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0.025[0.877], RESET-λ2(1) = 0.03[0.858], NOR-λ2(2) = 1.075[0.584], H-λ2(1) = 
3.79[0.052], H-F(1, 19) = 4.18[0.055], ARCH- λ2(1) = 0.70142[0.402], ARCH- 
λ2(2) = 0.553[0.468]. 
The re-estimated model  (equation (5.3) ) passes all diagnostic tests. In 
addition, we carried out tests on the stability of the model. Both of the CUSUM 
test and the CUSUM of squares test (figures  1 and 2 in Appendix) suggest that 
the model is stable over the sample period. We also carried out the predictive 
failure test (Chow‟s second test) which gives F1979  (16, 1) = 3.1606[0.418] where 
F1979 (., .) is the F statistics of the Chow‟s second test of predictive failures 
assuming 1979 due the second oil price shock as a break point. The test statistics 
reject the null hypothesis of structural breaks in 1979. Moreover, actual and fitted 
values of real per capita income generally move together; residuals of the model 
are generally within Two Standard Error Bands (figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix). 
Therefore, it is apparent that the overall fit of the model is very good. 
Having found a stable cointegrated relationship, an error correction (EC) 
model is constructed to confirm the cointegrated relationship and to examine the 
short-run dynamics of the model as suggested by the Granger representation 
theorem (GRT) (Engle and Granger (1987)). The GRT states that there should be 
an EC mechanism when variables are cointegrated and conversely, that EC 
mechanisms generate a cointegrated series. The GRT also states that the EC 
model explains the dynamics of the model where variables in first difference 
represent short-run dynamics and the first lag of level variables, i.e. the EC term, 
represents long-run dynamics. 
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In the EC model, we try to incorporate the first difference of INV as an 
independent variable in order to examine whether investment has a short-run 
impact, even though it does not have any significant impact in the long-run. The 
coefficients of the first difference of INV and FD are statistically insignificant and 
they are excluded from the EC model (results are available on request). Thus, the 
preferred and the most parsimonious estimated EC model is as follows: 
_R
2
 = 0.835, DW = 2.53, S.E. of regression 0.0094557, RSS = 0.0014306, SBC = 
61.084, AR1-F(1, 15) = 2.76[0.117], AR1-λ2(1) = 3.11[0.07], RESET-F(1,15) = 
0.0003[0.986], RESET-λ2(1) = 0.0004[0.945], NOR-λ2(2) = 1.01[0.603], H-λ2(1) 
= 0.95[0.329], H-F(1, 18) = 0.9[0.355]. 
The EC model (equation 5.4) passes all diagnostic and the coefficient of 
the EC term is negative and significant, supporting cointegrating relationship as 
suggested by  the GRT. 
Given the size of the sample, we also apply fully modified least squares 
(FMLS) method in order to examine the robustness of our EG results. The FMLS 
method corrects for any the problems of endogeneity or serial correlation which 
may be experienced by the EG method. The FMLS method is appropriate for 
estimation and inference when there exists a single cointegrating relation among 
I(1) variables, which is in fact the case here, as suggested by both our theoretical 
model and EG results. The FMLS method with sample periods from 1976-95, 
(-4.65)          (9.14)         (5.1)      (5.14)       
ECM 0.92 - DR 0.0013 + HC 0.18 + 010. =y  
**
1-t
***** 
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assuming at least one of the regressors has a drift and Parzen weights with two 
lags, is used. The estimated model is as follows
3
: 
INV is statistically insignificant, hence the re-estimated model excluding INV is as 
follows:  
The Explanation of the Empirical Results 
                                               
3
 
  These results are robust across various weight structures, i.e. Parzen, Bartlett 
and Tuckey weights, and lag structures. We are using Parzen weights as suggested 
by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) 
The overall results support the predictions of our  theoretical model, except the 
result for the impact of INV, that financial policies and government investment in 
human capital affect the rate of economic growth. More precisely, we observe that 
there is a cointegrated relationship among real per capita income (y), financial 
deepening (FD), real interest rates (DR) and human capital (HC) with y as a 
dependent variable. Our results show that HC, FD and DR have positive and 
statistically significant effects on y while the impact of the ratio of incremental 
output to capital (INV) is statistically insignificant. These results are robust across 
the both EG and FMLS methods. 
(5.18)         (13.10)        (16.05)       (-0.58)   (188.68)    
DR 0.001 +FD 0.16 +HC 0.34 +INV 0.08 - 917. =y 
**********
 
(5.82)        (13.76)       (15.89)   (329.46)    
DR 0.001 + FD 0.16 + HC 0.33 + 887. =y 
********
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The overall results reveal the highest positive real per capita income 
elasticity with respect to investment in HC. These results support the prediction of 
EGT which suggests that the improvement of the quality of working population is 
very important in the development process. Importantly, investment in education 
increases knowledge which in turn has effects on other sectors. Note also that R & 
D, innovation, specialisation and high technology projects require skilled 
manpower and these are unachievable in the absence of investment in HC. 
We also observe that the impact of INV on y is statistically insignificant. 
This result is not unexpected since it is widely accepted that the quality of both 
government and private physical investment in Bangladesh is very low because of 
prevalent corruption and bureaucratic red tape associated with both government 
investment and loans for private sector investment (Ahmed et al. (1991); Hossain 
and Rashid, (1997)). There is, for example, a very common practice in Bangladesh 
of grasping depositors‟ money from banks using bribes, personal influences and 
political pressures, making „false‟ investment and then declaring the business as 
„sick‟. The essence of the result on investment is that the quality in addition to the 
quantity of investment is important in order to increase economic growth. 
Our results also show that FD has a statistically significant and positive 
impact on y, which is consistent with our theoretical model that an increase in FD 
raises the supply or the  availability of funds which in turn increases investment 
and economic growth. However, the magnitude of this effect is not very high. The 
low effectiveness of FD and the statistically insignificant impact of INV highlight 
the inefficiency of the government sector and the poor management of credit that 
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goes to the private sector ((Ahmed et al. (1991); Hossain and Rashid, (1997)). In 
the case of Bangladesh, until the early 1990s, a significant proportion of credit was 
taken by the government to finance budget deficits. Credit to the private sector 
was confined to some selective borrowers who were politically and socially very 
influential. Thus, low FD implies that the banking sector serves only the 
government and influential borrowers and hence, productive potential borrowers 
were left with no credit. On the other hand, an increase in FD implies that FIs have 
more ability to lend potential borrowers. 
The empirical results also support the prediction that DR positively affect 
y. The main policy consideration of the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis is to 
increase DR to a positive level to encourage financial saving. A real positive or 
market clearing DR encourages borrowers to undertake only those projects which 
have returns above market clearing interest rates. Market clearing interest rates 
also reduce inefficiency associated with directed loans towards preferential 
sectors. Our results support these views. However, the magnitude of the 
coefficient of real rates is very low which is consistent with other findings on 
developing countries (Ghatak (1995)). This low interest elasticity is mainly due to 
the low level of y in Bangladesh. Since most of the earnings of people are spent on 
basic needs, people are left with very little money to save. The very small but 
significant coefficient of DR implies that DR liberalisation alone is unlikely to be 
able to expedite economic growth in Bangladesh. 
Note that the impact of FD on y is much higher than that of DR. An 
increase in FD is tantamount to a rise in the capacity for financial intermediation. 
On the other hand, an increase in DR indicates a rise in the costs of borrowing. 
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Thus, our results support the view that the availability of credit rather than their 
opportunity costs is the more important determinant of y in a LDC like 
Bangladesh. 
To sum up, our long-run results show that HC, FD and DR have 
statistically significant and positive impact on y, though the magnitude of the 
impact of DR is small. On the other hand, the impact of INV is statistically 
insignificant, implying that quality of investment is also important to increase y. 
Finally, the coefficients of ΔHC and ΔDR in our EC model are statistically 
significant and positive, implying  that short-run dynamics of these variables are 
also effective (equation 5.4). That is, y rises in the short-run in response to 
increases in HC and DR. In the short-run, INV and FD does not have any 
statistically significant impact on y. The short-run insignificant impact of FD may 
be due to the fact that there is a time delay in the transfer of available funds from 
the financial system to investment. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have developed an endogenous growth model including the ratio 
of incremental output to capital (INV), investment in human capital (HC), 
financial deepening (FD) and real interest rates (DR). This model predicts that 
economic growth mainly is generated from three factors: the proportion of saving 
channelled to investment (φ); (ii) the marginal productivity of capital (A) and (iii) 
the ratios of saving GDP (s). Financial liberalisation (FL) in the form of interest 
rate deregulation and an increase in FIs or financial deepening influences economic 
growth by raising φ, A and s. 
Our model predicts that a rise in real interest rates raises the returns on 
financial saving and encourages people to divert funds from non-financial to 
financial assets, i.e. an increase in s. An increase in FIs also raises competition and 
reduces investment leakage and thus a rise in φ. FIs increase the efficiency of 
investment by: (a) collecting information on investment opportunities; (b) 
providing the scope of risk sharing through portfolio diversification; (c) promoting 
training and education. 
This model has been applied to Bangladesh using annual data from 1975-
95, cointegration analysis and the fully modified least squares (FMLS) method. 
The results are robust across both methodologies. Our results reveal that there is 
multivariate cointegrated relationship among y, HC, FD and DR where y is the 
dependent variable, supporting the view that FD, DR and HC are important 
factors in boosting economic growth.  
The results reveal that HC is the one of the most important factors for 
increasing the growth of y. These results highlight the fact that development in 
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Bangladesh crucially depends on investment in education. The impact of INV on y 
is statistically insignificant. The insignificant impact of INV is not unexpected due 
to prevalent corruption associated with both government investment and the 
allocation of credit for private investment. 
We also observe that FD has a significant positive impact on the growth of 
y, which is in accord with our theoretical model. FL reduces direct lending and 
borrowing and increases FD and the availability of funds. FIs also channel funds 
towards efficient projects. Thus, an increase in FD increases the supply of 
investment towards relatively more productive sectors and hence, generates the 
growth of y. In addition, a rise in DR increases the supply of loanable funds as 
people are encouraged to hold financial assets instead of investing in inflation 
hedges and thus a rise in economic growth. 
However, the magnitude of the coefficient of DR is very low because of 
very low level of y and distortions in the financial sector. The very small but 
significant coefficient of DR also implies that the deregulation of interest rates 
alone are unlikely to be able to expedite economic growth in Bangladesh. The 
greater impact of FD than of DR implies that the availability rather than the 
opportunity costs (DR) of funds is more important in stimulating economic 
growth in Bangladesh. 
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Appendix: Table 1: Augmented Dicky-Fuller Test for Unit Roots 
 
Variables Levels  
No. 
of lags 
First  
Differences 
No.  
of lags 
y 1.4323 1 -9.7959 0 
INV -2.89 1 -4.73 0 
HC 0.12796 0 -3.8683 1 
FD -1.0736 2 -6.4469 1 
DR -0.54218 2 -15.9289 1 
The maximum number of lags for levels is chosen as two and for first difference as 
one. The number of lags  based on the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion appears to be 
sufficient to secure the lack of autocorrelation in error terms. Microfit 4.0 is used 
for computation. 
 
Table 2: Some Macroeconomic Indicators in Bangladesh 
 
GRM2 GRM290
17.7 33.16
26.98 42.09
16.18 24.3
13.63 18.01
18.58 29.57  
 
Average GY SGDP IGDP INV PCI P GBSB I DR 
1974-80 3.8
a
 1.47 10.64 2.01 117 19.3 17.02 1.15 -11 
1981-85 3.59 1.62 14.06 0.98 140 10.68 5.38 1.11 0 
1986-90 4.11 3.01 12.72 0.88 185 9.98 2.3 0.74 0.67 
1991-95 4.15 6.42 13.99 0.64 221 4.69 4.69 0.97  
0
.
7 
3
.
8
7 
1974-95 3.9 3 12.64 1.21 161 12.24 6.92 0.95 -3.1 
GY - real GDP growth rate, GDP deflator (base 1990) is used as a  deflator; 
SGDP- domestic savings (= domestically financed investment) as a % of GDP; 
IGDP - gross investment as a % of GDP; INV - incremental output capital ratio; 
PCI - per capita income in US Dollar; P- rate of inflation; GBSB - growth of total 
branches of schedule banks; I - the ratio of foreign (Euro dollar rates) to domestic 
(Bank Rates) interest rates; DR - real bank (discount) rates,  nominal bank rates 
minus P; 
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Table 2: continued 
 
Average FD FGDP BGDP MGDP XGDP OPEN UPRIM1 UPRIM 
1974-80 15 1.46 7.57 12.25 4.81 17.05 45.33 89.94 
1981-85 21.24 1.64 8.97 16.27 5.95 22.22 38.14 68.32 
1986-90 27.62 1.94 7.54 14.21 6.12 20.33 68.65 
222 
(198
d
) 
1991-95 33.2 2.01 7.48 14.74 9.11 23.86 
43.1 
(30.26
c
) 
95.25 
(44.62
c
) 
1974-95 23.4 1.64 7.86 14.17 6.34 20.52 48.5 116.25 
FD - M2 as a %  GDP; FGDP - the share of the financial sector in GDP; BGDP - 
government budget deficits as a % of GDP; MGDP -  imports ( c & f) as a share 
of GDP; XGDP - exports (f.o.b) as a % of GDP; OPEN - trade, exports (f. o. b) 
plus imports ( c & f ), as a % of GDP; UMPRIM - the differences between 
unofficial and official exchange rates as a % of official exchange rates; UMPRIM1 
- the differences between unofficial and official exchange rates as a % of unofficial 
exchange rates; a - 1975-1980 average; b - 1975-1995 average;  c - 1993-95 
average; d - 1985-92 average. 
 
Data Sources 
 
(A) Interest rates, official exchange rates, exports and imports from Bangladesh 
Bank (various years) Economic Trends; (B) saving, investment, consumer price 
index for middle income government employees in Dhaka city, population, 
government budget deficits from Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (various years) 
Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh; (C) GDP, GDP deflator, money supply from 
 IMF (various years) International Financial Statistical Yearbook; (D) unofficial 
exchange rates from Cowitt (various years) World/Picks Currency Yearbook. 
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